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Volume 34, Issue 5, Pages 389-395 (May 2008)


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Respiratory Disease in Army Recruits: Surveillance Program Overview, 1995–2006

Seung-eun Lee, MPHCorresponding Author Informationemail address, Angelia Eick, PhD, ScM, Paul Ciminera, MD, MPH

Background

Since 1966, the U.S. Army has had in place a comprehensive surveillance system for acute respiratory disease (ARD) because of its continued high incidence in the recruit population. A retrospective review of the program from 1995 to 2006, a continuation of an earlier analysis from 1985–1994, was performed to describe the program and to summarize group A streptococcal (GAS) outbreaks identified through this program.

Methods

Weekly incidence data and daily sentinel case data collected as part of the ARD surveillance program were analyzed in 2007 to report rates of ARD and GAS outbreaks over this 12-year period (1995–2006) for five participating Army sites.

Results

Average ARD rates were consistently higher from 2000 to 2006 than from 1995 to 1999. Rate ratios of winter rates to summer rates were greater than 1.0 prior to 2000, but from 2000 to 2006, ratios were consistently near 1.0. Rheumatogenic M types were available for three of five outbreaks.

Conclusions

Continuing high incidence of ARD in the military, re-emerging rheumatogenic M types, and a highly mobile military underscore the need for continued surveillance efforts. The continued employment of interventions with demonstrated effectiveness, such as chemoprophylaxis and basic preventive measures, is essential to reducing the burden of ARD.

Article Outline

Abstract

Introduction

Methods

The ARDS Program Setting and Surveillance Population

Components of ARDS Reporting

Metrics for the ARDS Program

Data Analysis

Results

Demographics

Rates of ARD

Strep Recovery Rates

Sentinel Cases

Outbreaks of GAS (+)

Discussion

Acknowledgment

References

Copyright

Introduction 

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Respiratory diseases are known to flourish in closed, crowded environments.1, 2 In such settings, bacteria and viruses are transmitted person-to-person via respiratory droplets, and typically result in acute self-limiting infections.3, 4 However, highly virulent and transmissible strains of pathogens can emerge and lead to high morbidity and mortality.5, 6, 7 The U.S. military recruit population has historically been at high risk for acute respiratory diseases (ARD).8 Both adenovirus and group A streptococcus (GAS) have been identified as important causes of ARD in this population.9, 10, 11, 12, 13 In addition, previously prevalent rheumatogenic GAS “emm/M types”—M5 and M18—continue to circulate in the Army trainee population, and an increasing number of trainee cases of invasive GAS are being reported, underscoring the risk posed to trainees.14 To prevent ARD outbreaks in the recruit setting, the military medical community has made seminal breakthroughs in preventing and treating respiratory disease: the use of penicillin (e.g., benzathine penicillin G [BPG]) as treatment and mass prophylaxis for GAS infection and the prevention of acute rheumatic fever (ARF), and the advent of the adenovirus vaccine.11, 15, 16, 17 In addition, the Army Acute Respiratory Disease Surveillance (ARDS) program was created to enhance surveillance in this population.18

Initially established in 1966 to monitor the prevalence of ARD and to evaluate a new adenovirus vaccine at Army basic training installations, the formerly titled Adenovirus Surveillance Program has been shown to be a valuable resource in understanding and investigating the epidemiology of respiratory disease.8 Since its inception, the ARDS program has evolved into a comprehensive program that consists of both sentinel and clinical surveillance systems for ARD. The program now includes both daily reporting of sentinel events and weekly reporting of clinical ARD cases, and has proven essential as an alert system for basic training installations.18 This retrospective review from 1995 to 2006 sought to describe the ARDS program over the past 12 years and to summarize the GAS outbreaks identified through it.

Methods 

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The ARDS Program Setting and Surveillance Population 

The ARDS program is conducted at U.S. Army initial entry training (IET) sites. IET for trainees consists of two parts: basic combat training (BCT), a 9-week course in basic soldiering skills, and advanced individual training (AIT), an occupation-specific training lasting up to 2 years following BCT. Contingent on occupation requirements, the BCT and AIT phases of IET may be combined (one-station unit training [OSUT]), in which the cohort remains intact for basic and occupational training. There are currently five installations in the U.S. where BCT and OSUT occur: Ft. Knox KY, Ft. Jackson SC, Ft. Leonard Wood MO, Ft. Sill OK, and Ft. Benning GA.

Within the first 3 days of entering training, trainees are administered vaccinations for several conditions, including those responsible for high ARD rates, as part of medical in-processing. These include vaccinations against measles; mumps; rubella; tetanus; diphtheria; pertussis (since 2006); hepatitis A (since 1995); hepatitis B (since 2002); varicella (since 1999); meningococcus; adenovirus 4, 7 (since 1971; vaccine production ceased in 1996; complete depletion of stocks in 1999); and influenza (seasonal).19 In addition, Ft. Leonard Wood, Ft. Sill, and Ft. Benning administer one dose of 1.2 million units BPG IM as a tandem chemoprophylaxis against GAS/ARF and as a means of reducing the prevalence of streptococcus.20

Components of ARDS Reporting 

Three key components define the Army ARDS program: active clinical reporting of ARD cases, GAS testing of ARD cases, and passive-provider reporting of sentinel cases. The ARDS program defines a clinical case of ARD as a trainee who has an oral temperature ≥38°C with symptoms consistent with a recent onset of acute respiratory infection and who was given job restrictions (i.e., limited-duty status) by a healthcare provider. Clinical case reports are typically received from three medical treatment facilities per participating installation: the troop medical clinic, the hospital emergency department, and the inpatient wards. A rapid strep test (since 2000) or a throat culture, or both, are performed on >80% of ARD cases.

The active clinical reporting component of the Army ARDS program entails installation ARD case reporting to installation public health assets, consolidation with installation at risk population numbers, and subsequent dispatch to the Army Medical Surveillance Activity (AMSA) for analysis. Installation reports include a list of cases and corresponding GAS results; a description of trainees at risk, including unit identification and type and week of training; and type of housing. Following analysis and compilation at AMSA, results (e.g., trend analysis) are returned to participating installations on the same day received.

The passive component of the Army ARDS program involves monitoring the Reportable Medical Events System (RMES), the U.S. Army's official reporting system for conditions of public health concern, for sentinel events of interest.21 The RMES requires reporting of events listed by the U.S. CDC as Nationally Notifiable Infectious Diseases in addition to several military-specific threats.22, 23 With regard to ARD and GAS, the three diseases within the RMES of most interest to this review are ARF, invasive group A streptococcus (invasive GAS), and streptococcal toxic shock syndrome (STSS). The three ARD- and GAS-relevant diagnoses, in addition to other respiratory diseases (e.g., meningococcal disease, tuberculosis) reported to RMES, prompt the interventions defined in the ARDS program guidance.19

Metrics for the ARDS Program 

According to the ARDS program guidance and for the purpose of this review19:


ARD rate (%)=(Total ARD cases/Total trainee-weeks) × 100

Strep recovery rate (%)=(Total throat culture (+) or rapid strep (+)/Total tests performed) × 100

Strep-ARD surveillance index (SASI)=(ARD rate) × (strep recovery rate).

The ARD rate characterizes the number of incident cases among the at-risk trainee population by week. The strep recovery rate indicates the percentage of throat culture or rapid strep tests which are positive. The SASI, or strep-ARD surveillance index, combines both the ARD rate and the strep recovery rate into a single metric. It has been shown to be a sensitive indicator of emerging outbreaks based on past Army experience.18 Established thresholds for intervention, based on clinical experience and expertise, have been established at 1.5% for the ARD rate and and 25.0 for SASI. Exceedance of either threshold for 2 consecutive weeks is defined as a potential outbreak and prompts investigation at the installation level.

Data Analysis 

The Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS) is the central repository for all service members' medical encounter and demographic data.24 Trainee rosters for each installation, according to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), have been available in DMSS only since January 1, 2001. Trainee demographic data from 1995–2000 were unavailable to reflect the early years of this surveillance overview. Analyses were performed in 2007 using SAS version 9.01.

This study is an update of an earlier analysis of the ARDS program from 1985 to 1994. It does not include surveillance data from Ft. Dix NJ or Ft. McClellan AL, because these installations stopped BCT training in 1992 and 1999, respectively.18

Results 

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Demographics 

Ft. Jackson had the greatest number of trainees, 174,951 over the 6-year period from 2001–2006, followed closely by Ft. Benning and Ft. Leonard Wood (Table 1). Trainees were primarily men. Ft. Knox, Ft. Sill, and Ft. Benning had <1% female trainees, while Ft. Leonard Wood and Ft. Jackson had 37% and 28% female trainees, respectively. Whites represented the highest proportion of trainees at each installation. The distribution of education level was similar across installations, with >63% of trainees possessing a high school diploma but <4% with a college degree. It is important to note that information on education level was less complete than other demographic characteristics.

Table 1.

Characteristics of trainees at each initial entry training (IET) installation (2001–2006)a

Ft. KnoxFt. JacksonFt. Leonard WoodFt. SillFt. Benning
No.%No.%No.%No.%No.%
TOTAL RECRUITS57,110 174,951 103,568 55,761 124,794
Gender
Male57,086100.0110,86563.474,44271.955,69399.9124,62599.9
Female240.064,08636.629,12628.1680.11690.1
Age (years)
17–1930,62453.692,34452.859,55157.528,92351.966,16053.0
20–2419,98735.059,24533.932,81231.719,70835.344,33935.5
25–294,6278.116,0939.27,8137.54,9408.910,5978.5
30–351,8723.37,2694.23,3923.32,1903.93,6983.0
Race/ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic41,18172.1105,72660.475,01272.441,45574.393,93575.3
Black7,22212.738,38321.913,83713.46,31511.311,3929.1
Hispanic6,06510.620,75311.99,9599.65,3819.712,88610.3
Other/Unknown2,6424.610,0895.84,7604.62,6104.76,5815.3
Education level
<High school6,56811.521,42012.218,42517.89,13416.415,17812.2
High school36,99264.8105,90860.559,24857.233,55260.278,50662.9
Some college2,0323.66,5373.73,8903.82,0673.74,5563.7
College degree1,0141.85,5423.22,8062.71,6883.03,5722.9
Unknown10,50418.435,54420.319,19918.59,32016.722,98218.4
Home of residenceb
South22,05738.675,84843.439,17437.821,79939.147,25837.9
Midwest13,62123.938,36021.927,67126.714,27525.630,27224.3
West11,87520.832,78218.719,74319.110,97419.726,21621.0
Northeast8,29714.524,19313.815,25414.77,76913.917,99814.4
Unknown1,2602.23,7682.21,7261.79441.73,0502.4
Service component
Active42,31774.1128,10573.269,46767.138,34568.894,83876.0
Guard14,07824.742,13624.130,70029.616,43629.529,06423.3
Reserve7151.34,7102.73,4013.39801.88920.7

IET, initial entry training

a

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) rosters for each installation have been available in the Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS) since 2001.

b

Region division based on U.S. Census Bureau and Office of Management and Budget classification.

Rates of ARD 

A total of 96,789 ARD cases were identified between 1995 and 2006 (Table 2). The median weekly ARD rate was greater among women than men (0.66% vs. 0.54%) for all years except 2001, 2002, and 2003. Average weekly ARD rates were consistently higher from 2000 to 2006 than from 1995 to1999. In addition, the rate ratios of winter rates to summer rates were greater than 1.0 prior to 2000, but from 2000 to 2006, ratios were consistently near 1.0 (Figure 1).

Table 2.

Yearly summary of ARDS indicators (January 1995–December 2006)

Trainee-weeksARD cases (rate/100/gender)ARD ratea(%)No. of GAS tests performed (% of year total ARD cases)No. of GAS (+) resultsStrep recovery rateb(%)No. of RMES casesc
YearMenWomenMenWomen
1995899,855145,1151,898(0.21)668(0.46)0.252,105(82.0)1627.690
1996996,546203,6221,391(0.14)802(0.39)0.181,650(75.2)1448.730
19971,007,202229,9832,239(0.22)813(0.35)0.253,052(100.0)2275.430
19981,028,670202,8682,735(0.26)949(0.47)0.303,269(88.7)1705.201
19991,144,596282,3944,805(0.42)2,226(0.79)0.497,031(100.0)3023.761
20001,290,170331,8778,866(0.69)2,372(0.71)0.6911,238(100.0)3673.020
20011,349,063315,95512,582(0.93)2,432(0.77)0.9014,766(98.3)6334.292
20021,370,476295,3449,663(0.70)1,948(0.66)0.7010,436(89.9)1,0249.812
20031,288,236298,76410,986(0.85)2,302(0.77)0.8412,044(90.6)3592.985
20041,311,052272,5747,655(0.58)2,529(0.93)0.649,485(93.1)2572.710
20051,156,250205,2106,592(0.57)1,559(0.76)0.607,182(88.1)5808.082
20061,396,989271,7497,188(0.51)1,589(0.58)0.538,162(93.0)89210.938
Total14,239,1053,055,45576,600(0.54)20,189(0.66)0.57f93,447(96.5)5,1175.32d21

ARD, acute respiratory disease; ARDS, acute respiratory disease surveillance; GAS, group A streptococcus; No., number; RMES, reportable medical events system.

a

Average weekly ARD rate (per 100 trainee-week) by year

b

Strep recovery rate=(Total Throat culture (+) or Rapid strep (+)/Total test performed) × 100

c

Includes only invasive GAS, toxic shock syndrome, acute rheumatic fever

d

Median


View full-size image.

Figure 1. ARD rate and rate ratios by year and season.


Differences in ARD rates and GAS rates were seen across installations. The median ARD rates for 1995–2006 were 0.59%, 0.56%, 0.36%, 0.08%, and 0.07% for Forts Jackson, Leonard Wood, Benning, Knox, and Sill, respectively. Yearly rates were consistently highest at Ft. Leonard Wood and lowest at Ft. Knox.

Outbreaks, as defined by the ARDS program guidance threshold criteria, also varied by installation. Ft. Knox experienced the least number of outbreaks, only one during summer 2003, and Ft. Leonard Wood the highest, at nine outbreaks occurring mostly in the winter season. No ARD outbreaks were reported between 1995 and 1998.

Strep Recovery Rates 

On an annual basis, more than 80% of ARD cases were tested by either a GAS rapid strep test or a throat culture. This proportion varied by installation (data not shown). Strep recovery rates peaked in 1995, 1996, 2002, 2005, and 2006, although these peaks did not correspond with ARD peaks (Table 2). On average, 4% of ARD cases tested were positive for GAS, excluding the aforementioned peak years for strep recovery rates.

Sentinel Cases 

Twenty-one sentinel case reports were submitted via the passive system from 1995 through 2006 (Table 2). Invasive GAS was the most common GAS-related RMES sentinel diagnosis during the 12-year period. The high number of invasive GAS cases observed in 2003 and 2006 were attributable to GAS outbreaks at Ft. Knox and Ft. Leonard Wood, respectively. No cases of STSS were reported in this period, and only one ARF case (1998, Ft. Leonard Wood) was reported in this period.

Outbreaks of GAS (+) 

Five selected GAS outbreaks are highlighted in this analysis, four of which were investigated and interventions implemented by installation public health. The fifth outbreak, at Ft. Leonard Wood in 2006, prompted a formal investigation by the U.S. Army Medical Command.

In December 2002, Ft. Sill reported a sentinel case of invasive GAS (pneumonia). Strep recovery rates during this outbreak were as high as 89%. Targeted mass BPG chemoprophylaxis (in addition to the regular administration of tandem BPG prophylaxis during medical in-processing) to high-risk units (i.e., high ARD counts in specific units found by information in the clinical reporting component of the ARDS program) was implemented to prevent further GAS-related illnesses. However, ARD thresholds were never exceeded for 2 consecutive weeks. In contrast, the SASI exceeded the threshold for more than 2 consecutive weeks in February 2002 and sporadically throughout the winter season. There were no reports of BPG shortages during this outbreak.

Ft. Knox experienced an outbreak in the summer and early fall of 2003. A sentinel event, a fatal case of invasive GAS (necrotizing fasciitis), occurred in June 2003, followed by four more nonfatal cases (one of necrotizing fasciitis, one of prepatellar bursitis, and two of cellulitis) within 3 months. Only the ARD rates reached outbreak levels in late August. During 2 of the 4 weeks, GAS was isolated in 30%–40% of ARD cases tested. Implementation of enhanced preventive measures included thorough cleaning of shared equipment, frequent cleaning of canteens, increased availability of soap, reorganization of barracks space, and basic hygiene education. The invasive cases subsided without the administration of BPG during this outbreak.

An additional invasive GAS outbreak occurred at Ft. Knox in 2006. Neither the ARD nor SASI threshold was exceeded, nor had sentinel reports been sent to RMES. However, preventive medicine personnel were alerted to the possibility of a virulent strain of GAS by a trainee who had been admitted to the hospital for GAS (+) pneumonia. Within 2 weeks, two additional cases from the same training unit were admitted to the hospital. In response, BPG-targeted prophylaxis was administered to all trainees in that unit.

The last two highlighted outbreaks occurred at Ft. Leonard Wood. The first outbreak presented with a sentinel case (STSS) in December 2005, and both the ARD and SASI indices exceeded outbreak levels. Three additional trainees were admitted for GAS (+) pneumonia. In response, targeted mass BPG prophylaxis was initiated. The decision for targeted mass chemoprophylaxis versus installation-wide (trainee) mass chemoprophylaxis was influenced by the need to maintain an emergency stockpile. Of note was a shortfall in the BPG supply for the provision of chemoprophylaxis to incoming trainees that had been reported since September 2005. Following the return of trainees from holiday leave, a high SASI continued for an additional 5 weeks until the beginning of spring.

In the fall of 2006, seven sentinel cases of GAS (one of STSS, two of necrotizing fasciitis, and four of pneumonia) were reported from Ft. Leonard Wood. In response, only units with high ARD and GAS (+) counts were targeted for BPG prophylaxis. However, new GAS (+) cases and high counts of ARD were then observed in other units. SASI levels exceeded thresholds sporadically in October and November, but never for 2 consecutive weeks. A policy of mass prophylaxis with BPG and tandem prophylaxis with oral penicillin VK (due to a shortage of BPG), in addition to basic preventive medicine measures, was instituted in response to the continued high rates of disease, and ARDS indices returned to normal.

Group A streptococcal M-typing during these outbreaks varied by site. During the Ft. Sill outbreak, no M-typing was done, and data from the 2003 Ft. Knox outbreak were not available. During the 2005 Ft. Leonard Wood outbreak, all ten isolates tested were M5. During the 2006 Ft. Leonard Wood outbreak, 31 isolates were tested: 24 were M5; three were M101; two were M77; and two were M18. Thirty isolates were tested during the 2006 Ft. Knox outbreak, and M5 was identified in 23, M4 in six, and M2 in one isolate. Only the M18 cases exhibited mucoid morphology.25

Discussion 

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The 9-week basic trainee environment is mentally and physically demanding, and this, coupled with the mixing of young, immunologically naive adults from all parts of the U.S. and confined living quarters, leaves Army trainees particularly susceptible to both ARD and GAS.2 The three components of the Army ARD surveillance program worked in concert to identify periods of unusually high ARD and GAS activity; where the clinical component did not reach outbreak thresholds, reports through the sentinel component of the ARDS program prompted preventive medicine personnel to intervene in a timely manner.

There was substantial variation by year during the 12 years between 1995 and 2006. A striking difference in ARD rates before and after 1999 was observed; this had been explained previously in other studies, in part by the depletion of adenovirus vaccine during the years 1996–1999.26, 27 Another trend that was observed—the lack of ARD seasonality after 1999—can also be explained by the depletion of adenovirus vaccine supply. ARD rates were similar, regardless of season, before the adenovirus vaccine was implemented at Army basic training sites.8 Since adenovirus disease commonly occurs irrespective of season, similar ARD rates in the summer months and winter/spring seasons were expected after the discontinuation of the adenovirus vaccine.28

The 2002–2006 outbreaks reviewed in the current study highlight the constant threat GAS poses to trainees. During ARD outbreaks, more than 30% of cases were associated with positive GAS tests, and even during times when strep recovery rates did not exceed 30%, invasive GAS cases were reported. Fortunately, both chemoprophylaxis and basic preventive measures were shown to be effective in limiting the severity and transmission length of GAS outbreaks.18 For instance, the observed connection between periods of BPG shortage and GAS outbreaks was expected. BPG is indicated among trainees to prevent or eliminate streptococcus from the pharynx, and its wide use prevents manifestations (e.g., cellulitis) other than pharyngitis.29, 30, 31 Furthermore, basic preventive measures, such as those employed to halt the 2003 Ft. Knox and 2006 Ft. Leonard Wood outbreaks, require consideration in concert with changes in chemoprophylaxis use.32 Experience from past outbreaks has demonstrated that both mass and tandem BPG prophylaxis, along with basic preventive measures, are effective means for quelling GAS outbreaks.18, 30, 33

This review was limited in several respects, including a lack of M type results and morphology of GAS (+) isolates for two outbreaks discussed. Furthermore, there was no concurrent viral testing performed on GAS (+) outbreak cases to evaluate the potential role of other respiratory pathogens in the outbreak. It is important to note that the majority of ARD cases with low strep recovery rates may have been attributed to several other key bacteria and viruses such as Chlamydia pneumoniae, Haemophilus influenzae, Mycoplasma pneumoniae, Streptococcus pneumoniae, adenovirus, parainfluenza virus, and respiratory synctial virus.26, 34, 35 These pathogens are frequent contributors to ARD and may present with similar clinical characteristics to GAS infections. Recovery rates for ARD and strep captured by the ARD system may be an underestimate of underlying disease at the installation, as only those trainees who sought treatment at a clinic or a hospital were captured. Small sample sizes for invasive and noninvasive GAS isolates and insufficient recruit denominator data limited statistical analyses of M types and risk factors in this population.

Military initial entry training is a unique experience characterized by crowded living, extreme physical stress, and suspect hygiene practices, creating ideal host–environment–agent interactions for pathogens such as GAS.2, 32, 36 The invasive potential of GAS remains, and cases continue despite the availability of antibiotics. Furthermore, continuing high incidence of ARD in the military, reemerging rheumatogenic M types, and a highly mobile military underscore the need for continued surveillance efforts.14, 37

Although efforts toward a GAS vaccine and clinical trials of an adenovirus vaccine for use in the military population show promise, the latter is a minimum of 2 years from licensure, and it will likely be many more years before the former becomes available.38, 39 The answer to the question of how to effectively deal with ARD remains the same: the continued employment of interventions with demonstrated effectiveness such as chemoprophylaxis, vaccines, and basic preventive measures. The role of continued vigilance for the identification of nascent outbreaks cannot be overstated.

The results of this review may not be generalizable to a civilian population because of differences in immunization rates and circulating respiratory pathogens. Similarly, the application of the ARDS program to another population may be difficult because of limited longitudinal follow-up. Further interdisciplinary collaborative research efforts to address issues contributing to the burden of ARD among trainees will benefit not only the military but also inhabitants of similar setting such as college dorms, hospitals, nursing homes, prisons, and ships.40

 

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The authors would like to thank LTC (MC) Steven Tobler and CPT (MS) Michael S. Bloom for their critical review of the manuscript; preventive medicine staff at Forts Jackson, Leonard Wood, Benning, Sill, and Knox for facilitating collection of surveillance data. The opinions expressed here are the authors' alone and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. No external funding was received for this study.

No financial disclosures were reported by the authors of this paper.

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Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (provisional), U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, Silver Spring, Maryland

Corresponding Author InformationAddress correspondence and reprint requests to: Seung-eun Lee, MPH, Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (provisional), U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, 2900 Linden Lane, Suite 200, Silver Spring MD 20910.

 The full text of this article is available via AJPM Online at www.ajpm-online.net; 1 unit of Category-1 CME credit is also available, with details on the website.

PII: S0749-3797(08)00163-3

doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2007.12.027


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