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Volume 34, Issue 3, Supplement, Pages S42-S47 (March 2008)


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Building Social Capital Through Neighborhood Mobilization: Challenges and Lessons Learned

Pedro R. Payne, PhDCorresponding Author Informationemail address, Kirk R. Williams, PhD

Abstract

This paper describes a neighborhood-level intervention to promote the well-being of children up to five years old and their families in the City of Riverside, California. As a case study, the narrative presented here conveys how, in 2002, this city addressed the problem of youth violence through a theoretically informed approach to neighborhood mobilization. The approach is grounded in the assumption that such violence can ultimately be prevented by rebuilding social capital depleted by rapid and extensive neighborhood changes during the past decade. The theoretical premises underlying the mobilization approach are briefly summarized. Additionally, the challenge of blending theory and practice, as well as the fiscal, political, and social issues encountered in the initial implementation of this initiative, are discussed.

Article Outline

Abstract

Introduction

Community Change and Diminished Social Capital

Mobilization Goals and Strategies

Mobilization Methods

Mobilization Results

Discussion: Challenges and Lessons Learned

The Challenge of Blending Theory and Practice

Fiscal Challenges

Political Challenges

Social Challenges

Conclusion

Acknowledgment

References

Copyright

Introduction 

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Most interventions to prevent youth violence involve the implementation of programs focusing on “at-risk” youth, not their neighborhoods.1, 2 This paper describes a case study of The Arlanza Neighborhood Initiative, a neighborhood-level intervention implemented in Riverside, California, consisting of a community engagement component and construction of a community center. Details are provided of the journey from planning to initial implementation of this youth violence prevention effort. The roadmap for this journey was created by aligning theory with the neighborhood mobilization effort. That alignment, and the challenges addressed as the journey unfolded, are both discussed.

The objective of this narrative is to tell the story of one neighborhood mobilization as cataloged by a participant observer (P.R.P.). Based on a violence prevention plan designed collaboratively by the Mayor of Riverside and the Youth Crime Prevention Red Team, implementation required the participation of neighborhood residents and other constituencies. Field notes from the implementation period, including in-depth interviews, form the basis of this report. Hence, this observational case study uses participant-observation methodology, and is not based on a structured survey or other more formalized methodologic approaches.

Community Change and Diminished Social Capital 

Rapid and extensive community changes often destabilize neighborhood social capital,3, 4, 5, 6 including the social networks among residents (bonding social capital) and the linkages that connect neighborhood residents to opportunities, organizations, and services in the larger community (bridging or linking social capital).7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 Depletion of this social capital undermines two aspects of neighborhood organization and culture that support healthy youth development: (1) the organizational capacity of neighborhoods to engage in collective action, that is, the strength of their social bonds and the level of trust that infuses those bonds, and (2) the willingness of neighborhood residents to realize their common interests through collective action, such as addressing neighborhood affairs and monitoring neighborhood activities, especially those involving youth. Fragmented social capital produced by rapid and extensive neighborhood changes weakens or even destroys these two components of neighborhood “collective efficacy.”13, 14 Attenuated social bonds and diminished supervision and support allow youth crime and violence to flourish.6, 13, 14, 15

The Arlanza neighborhood experienced significant negative changes in the 1990s. Industry replaced residential areas, and traditional social networks began to destabilize. The major employer reduced its staff from 7000 to just over 700, forcing many long-term residents to move from Arlanza in pursuit of jobs elsewhere. Such migration undermined the social connections in the neighborhood, weakening its bonding social capital. The bridging social capital provided by employment, local neighborhood associations, and civic clubs also disappeared. Crime and violence in Arlanza increased along with these changing conditions.

A high concentration of disadvantaged youth and low-income Latino families now inhabit the Arlanza area. According to the 2000 U.S. Census,16 58% of the Arlanza population is Latino, about 30% foreign born, mostly of Mexican descent. Nearly a quarter of the residents have no high school diploma or GED. Of approximately 29,000 residents, 42% speak Spanish only or very little English.

These data give only a partial picture of Arlanza, an area socially isolated from the larger community and what it has to offer. Many local residents felt “forgotten” and “unimportant,” perceptions that can significantly affect engagement in the neighborhood. Many families were undocumented, and either afraid to seek or unaware of available social services. The language barrier widened the social divide between social organizations and residents who feared being “discovered” and perhaps deported. The effort to overcome the suspicion that comes from this immigration status is still a key social issue, which must be addressed in the city’s efforts to develop social capital in this community.

Faced with these challenges, the City of Riverside developed a strategic plan for youth violence prevention, which involved the Riverside Youth Crime Prevention Red Team. Plan implementation was overseen by a partnership (the Riverside Youth Violence Prevention Policy Board). A major focus of the neighborhood mobilization component was to identify neighborhood and residents’ assets and create an integrated network to strengthen social capital and the capacity for collective action to improve conditions. For example, an important component of the project was establishing a family and neighborhood resource center to provide community leadership training, facilitate the coordination of social services from various city and county agencies, and provide affordable child care with preschool, information, and referral services.

Recognizing that people are a neighborhood’s greatest asset, the initiative enlisted the help of residents willing to use their own individual capacities on behalf of their neighborhood. The assumption was that, by doing so, residents would begin to rediscover one another and realize that their problems could be solved through ongoing, positive, and cooperative relationships between neighbors, rather than depending on an outside entity to “fix” the problems. Mobilizing community residents to work together would create bonding, bridging, and linking social capital.17, 18, 19

Mobilization Goals and Strategies 

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Participating city and county agencies emphasized strengthening neighborhoods by affirming and supporting healthy social relationships, thus helping residents thrive and collectively address challenges, such as youth violence. This was the guiding principle behind the Arlanza Neighborhood Initiative, which included several goals in addition to reducing youth violence. For example, participating agencies wanted to identify and expand existing community assets, such as neighborhood associations, church- and school-based programs, library services, and community-based police programs, while creating new assets and services where needed. They also wanted to expand free or low-cost child care and school readiness programs for children up to age five. To help residents build bonding and bridging social capital by working together with city and county agencies to improve the lives of neighborhood youth would require an organizational vehicle.

Mobilization Methods 

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The organizational vehicle developed was a neighborhood resource center, which provided a setting where residents could find various agencies, services, and community associations working to meet neighborhood needs. More importantly, the resource center would serve as a place to coordinate activities, one in which residents could build new relationships and rediscover old ones in the process of collaborating to solve neighborhood problems. The partners in this neighborhood mobilization effort recognized it would require a long-term commitment.

Implementation involved both an asset mapping component and a service delivery component. The goal of asset mapping was to aid residents in identifying local leadership and developing bonding social capital through neighbor-to-neighbor interaction, identifying what each person has to offer the neighborhood, and collectively deciding how to integrate individual assets. The plan called for enlisting community volunteers to go door-to-door and administer an “Individual Capacities Survey,” designed to identify local individuals and community leaders willing to share their skills and abilities in such areas as healthcare, clerical work, construction, maintenance, transportation, communication skills, business skills, and food preparation.17 This strategy had the promise of engaging neighbors in the process and affording them an opportunity to meet other neighbors. This vital step of asset mapping is the mechanism for building neighbor-to-neighbor relationships and thus the bonding social capital needed to strengthen the social fabric of Arlanza. The goal is to administer the survey periodically, to reflect demographic shifts in the neighborhood. Institutional and organizational mapping was also done to identify agencies that were instrumental for building social connections inside and outside the Arlanza neighborhood and for providing needed services at the neighborhood resource center.

Mobilization Results 

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Mapping institutional assets identified agencies and organizations that eventually formed the Riverside Youth Violence Prevention Policy Board (Table 1). The data collected belonged to the neighborhood and was kept in the neighborhood resource center for use by active grassroots groups.

Table 1.

Agencies identified through asset mapping

Alvord Unified School District
Arlanza Area Clergy Team
Arlanza Community Garden
Hedrick Street Neighborhood Watch Group
Kaiser Permanente
Padres Unidos of Norte Vista High School
Riverside Community Health Foundation
Riverside County Department of Health
Riverside County Department of Mental Health
Riverside County Office of Education
Riverside County Probation Department
Riverside County Public and Social Services
Riverside Police Department
Robert Presley Center for Crime and Justice Studies
Youth Services Center of Riverside

Apart from identifying local assets, other pressing needs in the neighborhood required “outside” assistance. Specifically, services needed to be identified and linked to residents through an accessible service delivery mechanism (i.e., bridging and linking social capital had to be established). To that end, social services were made available through the centrally located neighborhood resource center, the Eric M. Solander Arlanza Youth and Family Resource Center. The Solander Center included the Arlanza Child Development Program, a 48-slot day care center with state preschool services, and a 3000 square foot office operated by the county’s Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program, providing nutritional services, counseling, medical referrals, food vouchers, and preliminary health screening to neighborhood women. The Center also included shared office space for use by other visiting programs such as Project BRIDGE (a gang violence prevention program), Padres Unidos (a grassroots organization that raises funds for college scholarships for underrepresented Latino youth), and youth and family counseling services provided by the Youth Service Center and the Department of Mental Health. Other neighborhood programs also benefited from having a place to plan events and hold neighborhood meetings.

Building this social capital provided the basis for collective and cooperative action through relationships with such key partners as schools, police, and faith-based organizations in the community. They brought services to the neighborhood, provided a way to seek help, and gave the neighborhood a voice in city and county politics. For example, the English Learning Advisory Committee (ELAC), originally designed to act as a Latino version of the PTA, provided a forum for Spanish-speaking parents to address issues and grievances about their children’s education. This group, consisting mostly of first generation Mexican immigrant parents with limited English skills, was officially recognized by the schools, enabling these parents to become more involved in their children’s education. Neighborhood schools helped facilitate meeting locations and coordination between parents and the Arlanza Neighborhood Initiative.

The police Chief and local police Lieutenant participated in various community events, and the Chief’s office helped in the acquisition of local crime data. A group of local clergy, the Arlanza Area Clergy Team, was created to increase the role and visibility of local churches in neighborhood engagement and beautification projects such as a park clean-up and two Thanksgiving meal events.

Two of the Solander Center services appear to have been successful in the first two years of their neighborhood outreach. The Arlanza Child Development Program provided child care to approximately 300 of the 352 families living in poverty with children under the age of 18, and the WIC program provided nutritional and health services to over 3883 women, infants, and children. Even so, whether a neighborhood-wide awareness of the Solander Center has been created and whether residents are satisfied with its services remain unknown, as is the extent to which the Center has succeeded in being the organizational vehicle for forging and solidifying social bonds among residents. In terms of the ultimate outcome of reducing youth violence, juvenile arrests (for assault, battery, stolen property, vandalism, weapons, drug violations, disorderly conduct, or vagrancy) in Arlanza have dropped by 41% since 2002. However, those counts have also dropped throughout the city of Riverside, so the reduction in Arlanza cannot yet be attributed to the neighborhood mobilization effort and the presence of the Solander Center. A more rigorous assessment is planned at the end of 2008 to determine whether Arlanza residents are aware of and satisfied with the Solander Center and whether the neighborhood experienced a significant reduction in crime and violence. This evaluation, by the Robert Presley Center for Crime and Justice Studies, will assess the impact of the initiative and make recommendations, if needed, to improve the neighborhood building effort. The hope is that these accomplishments will be achieved through a process emphasizing local input and decision making through regular meetings with residents, neighborhood groups, schools, and faith-based organizations in conjunction with the Riverside Youth Violence Prevention Policy Board and the City of Riverside. It should be noted, though, that the evaluation has not been designed as a randomized trial and evidence of the impact of the Solander Center and other neighborhood mobilization efforts therefore will only be suggestive, not definitive.

Nonetheless, these attempts to mobilize the neighborhood were done with the explicit intent of building social capital to provide an infrastructure for residents and increasing the chances of creating lasting relationships and cooperative efforts, thus enhancing the quality of life in Arlanza.

Discussion: Challenges and Lessons Learned 

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The theoretical premises summarized above were not explicitly stated in the violence prevention plan developed by the Mayor’s Youth Crime Prevention Red Team. Nonetheless, existing theory about neighborhood dynamics and violence can be aligned with mobilization activities in implementing the plan within Arlanza. Such a theoretically guided approach, however, has its challenges.

The Challenge of Blending Theory and Practice 

Social and behavioral scientists should shoulder the responsibility of delineating the policy and practical implications of their theories,20, 21, 22 and elected officials must face the challenge of using theory and research to inform public policies. Applying theoretical frameworks to concrete social problems can be daunting. Indeed, what may appear sound on paper often becomes exceedingly complicated in real life.

Social and behavioral scientists must also develop systematic explanatory models that can be confirmed or refuted by empirical data. Regardless of the rigor, however, such scholarly activity does not reveal the effort required to sustain the momentum of a theoretically informed mobilization effort and the motivation of the partners involved. Immediate results are often demanded. Elected officials typically want to see results during their tenure, but problems such as youth violence can be deeply rooted, with immediate resolutions being unrealistic. Overcoming such intractable issues requires a comprehensive and enduring effort. Yet elected officials often want a “quick fix,” knowing they will be held accountable. Patience is required from both elected officials and their constituencies. The Arlanza neighborhood initiative sought to prevent youth violence by focusing on families with children under the age of five. Realizing the outcomes for these children will involve long-term, sustained efforts by the city and local residents, tenaciously adhering to the effort and not abandoning it after two or three years.

Another challenge was balancing fidelity of the intervention and its underlying theory while engaging residents and elected officials at the level of their understanding. Their voices needed be heard and honored, but they also needed to be orchestrated to avoid a cacophony. Understanding the dynamics that unraveled the social fabric of Arlanza was crucial for devising strategies to rebuild social capital and revitalize the neighborhood. That understanding, however, had to be conveyed in terms understandable to residents and community leaders. Although the disruptions in family and neighborhood networks, the lack of role models, and the increased isolation from mainstream life in Riverside all underscored the relevance of these theoretical premises, several real factors had to be considered. These included overcoming neighborhood skepticism and creating buy-in from all stakeholders, connecting community issues to theoretical principles without confusing residents and other participants with theoretical abstractions, and remaining flexible by adjusting to unforeseen circumstances.

The chances of overcoming neighborhood skepticism and achieving buy-in successfully were enhanced by contacting neighborhood residents directly and personally, to win their trust. Local residents were often skeptical about the ability of “outsiders” with “new ideas” to solve longstanding problems. Facilitating a dialogue that helped residents see their circumstances through a different lens, while including their vision in their own terms, was essential.

Connecting neighborhood problems with theoretical principles posed another challenge. Meetings with public officials, often less than 30 minutes long, did not allow for lengthy theoretical explanations. A better approach was to explain the key goals of the project briefly, then leave behind printed materials with information on specific programs and how community members could become involved. For example, it was always important to remind local leaders that re-establishing and maintaining social relationships and accountability were the path to the long-term benefits of reduced youth violence in the community. If time permitted, specifics of the programs and community involvement strategies were discussed in greater detail.

Another issue that arose during implementation was balancing the different agendas of the participating agencies. Although each agency had a niche in which it specialized and an agenda for action, they had to work together for the common goal of helping Arlanza meet its needs, not simply furthering organizational interests.

Fiscal Challenges 

One fiscal challenge was a history of tension in city–county collaborations in Riverside. This surfaced at meetings, especially on the question of who was responsible for funding services, and was aggravated by the fact that both the city and county were facing severe budget cuts. Careful and diplomatic interactions were required to obtain the needed funding and cooperation from the various agencies providing social services to Arlanza.

The Arlanza Neighborhood Initiative also faced the challenge of implementing an intervention without funding in place. The planning phase of this initiative had grant support, but the implementation funding was only gradually acquired over 18 months. Securing necessary funds from a variety of public and private sources was time-intensive and required unanticipated relationship-building effort at the city, county, and state levels.

To maintain fiscal sustainability, the Solander Center was designed to use the monies collected from the two main tenants (i.e., county WIC office and the child care center) for maintenance, repair, and operations. Operating costs were fortunately kept to a minimum, because the Center was on city-owned property and received municipal services from the city-owned utility company.

Political Challenges 

Even well-researched, theory-based interventions may never be implemented if they do not have political support. Earning this support is a specific example of building bridging or linking social capital between the neighborhood and the political decision makers in the city, which is ultimately necessary for political and fiscal support.

The Arlanza Neighborhood Initiative enjoyed the political support of the city council member whose ward included the neighborhood, as well as two other council members. The investment of time and relationship building with these people was strategic to the initial implementation of the initiative. Two years after the project was approved by the city council, however, local elections had occurred: three of seven wards had elected new council members, and the primary focus of city government shifted towards economic development. This did not immediately affect the Arlanza Neighborhood Initiative, but these political shifts had to be navigated carefully to ensure the momentum of this neighborhood mobilization effort and ultimately the success of desired outcomes. Although the City of Riverside is engaged in efforts to increase economic development, the original plans for the Arlanza Initiative remain intact, and the city is currently exploring ways to balance the economic goals of the city with the need to maintain the sustainability of the initiative. The Solander Center continues to offer workshops and seminars on immigration and citizenship, health issues, and how to build stronger social bonds as well as classes on parenting skills, domestic violence prevention, conflict resolution, and education for parents to help their children avoid gang involvement. Home ownership workshops and stress management seminars are under consideration. The support of the city’s political leaders will ultimately determine the outcome of this effort. Understanding how politics operates and what motivates politicians is vital for successful implementation of this initiative.

Social Challenges 

One of the most critical issues to consider when implementing a neighborhood-level initiative is that success hinges largely on the level of trust engendered among the residents themselves: trust in the mobilization effort and trust in each other. In low-income, underserved communities, local residents may be suspicious of, or even hostile to, any person or plan associated or identified with government or educational institutions. Sparkling theories and slick plans may have little currency without forging solid relationships, trust, and a mutual understanding of the social conditions under which neighborhood residents cope and survive. For this intervention to be successful, the residents themselves had to become agents of change and believe in the process. This required time, patience, and relationship building within the neighborhood and between residents and those spearheading the mobilization process. Continued community engagement through the Center’s neighborhood coordinator will aid in mitigating the skepticism of some local residents.

Conclusion 

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The challenges and lessons learned were drawn from the initial implementation process of the larger Arlanza Neighborhood Initiative. The long-term success of this initiative, of course, remains to be seen and is clearly an empirical question to be addressed through independent evaluation. As noted above, however, the first major accomplishment was achieved: the creation of the Eric M. Solander Arlanza Youth and Family Resource Center, which opened its doors and began offering services in October 2004.

The discussion of the theoretical premises of this neighborhood mobilization effort and the challenges and lessons learned are offered to provide a “troubleshooting guide” that other communities can tailor to their specific situations. The entire discussion is offered in hopes of showing how formulating neighborhood-level public policy interventions to reduce youth violence can be guided by social and behavioral science theory and research.

 

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This project was supported in part by the Southern California Academic Center of Excellence in Youth Violence Prevention, funded by The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Grant # R49\CCR918589).

No financial disclosures were reported by the authors of this paper.

References 

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Robert Presley Center for Crime and Justice Studies, University of California, Riverside, Riverside, California

Corresponding Author InformationAddress correspondence and reprint requests to: Pedro R. Payne, PhD, Project Coordinator, Robert Presley Center for Crime and Justice Studies, University of California, Riverside, Riverside CA 92521.

PII: S0749-3797(07)00752-0

doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2007.12.010


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